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FORGOING DRUGS ON GROUNDS OF COST: A 
PERSPECTIVE FROM CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE 
ETHICS AND SOCIAL TEACHING 
Janine Marie Idziak* 
This paper will explore the ethical dimensions of decisions to 
forgo (or even deny) drugs on grounds of cost in the case of 
elderly long-term care residents.  The specific ethical framework 
employed will be that of Catholic health care ethics and social 
teaching.  We will begin by describing the various accounts of 
the role of cost in making decisions about forgoing medical 
treatments found in Catholic health care ethics, historical and 
contemporary.  A hypothetical case study will be introduced to 
aid in critically assessing these accounts. Finally, we will 
propose four principles to govern decisions about providing or 
denying drugs on grounds of cost.  These governing principles 
will attempt to balance respect for the sanctity and inherent 
value of each human life with the common good of the 
community. 
COST AND THE ORDINARY/EXTRAORDINARY TREATMENT 
DISTINCTION 
Familiar to many is the distinction between ordinary and 
extraordinary medical treatments and the accompanying 
principle that ordinary treatments must always be undertaken 
but that it is morally permissible to forgo treatments which are 
extraordinary in character.1  Less well known is the fact that, 
 
* Janine Marie Idziak, Ph.D., is Professor of Philosophy and director of 
the Bioethics Center at Loras College.  She also serves as Consultant for 
Health Care Ethics and Life Issues for the Archdiocese of Dubuque, 
Iowa.  Dr. Idziak is the author of two books pertaining to long-term 
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historically, the cost of a treatment factored into the 
determination that a particular treatment qualified as 
“extraordinary” in character. 
In his doctoral dissertation Conserving Human Life, originally 
published in 1958, Bishop Daniel Cronin notes that “moral 
theologians have always taken into account the element of 
expense when discussing the ordinary and extraordinary means 
of conserving life.”2  Specifically, “[t]hey have constantly taught 
that any means of conserving life which imposes an excessive 
hardship on an individual because of cost is an extraordinary 
means.”3  Historically, such terms as sumptus extraordinarius 
(extraordinary expenditure), media pretiosa (high priced means), 
and media exquisita (very best means) were used  for this concept, 
which goes back to such Catholic moralists as the sixteenth 
century Spanish Dominicans Francisco de Vitoria and Domingo 
Banez and the sixteenth century English Benedictine Gregory 
Sayrus.4 
In his book, Catholicism and Health-Care Justice, Philip Keane 
notes that “the traditional Catholic moral manuals of the pre-
Vatican II era regularly mentioned high cost as a factor that 
could render a medical treatment extraordinary and non-
obligatory.”5  Indeed, the manual of the Jesuit Edwin F. Healy, 
revised in 1956 shortly before the beginning of Vatican II, went 
so far as to stipulate $2,000 as the line of demarcation “between 
low-cost (and therefore ordinary) treatments and higher-cost 
 
care, ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN LONG-TERM CARE and ORGANIZATIONAL 
ETHICS IN SENIOR HEALTH CARE SERVICES. She is a past recipient of the 
Trustee of the Year award from the American Association of Homes 
and Services for the Aging. 
 1.  General Policy on the Use of Life-Sustaining Treatments, LORAS COLLEGE, 
http://www2.loras.edu/~CatholicHE/Arch/Death/policies.html (last visited Dec. 14, 
2011). 
 2.  DANIEL A. CRONIN, ORVILLE N. GRIESE & ALBERT S. MORACZEWSKI, 
CONSERVING HUMAN LIFE 107 (Russell E. Smith ed., 1989). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. at 86–87, 107. 
 5.  PHILIP S. KEANE, CATHOLICISM AND HEALTH-CARE JUSTICE 42 (2002). 
13.1_(4)IDZIAK.PRINT.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/29/2012  8:40 AM 
2011] FORGOING DRUGS ON GROUNDS OF COST 91 
(and therefore extraordinary) treatments.”6  In the 1997 fourth 
edition of their classic textbook Health Care Ethics: A Theological 
Analysis, the Dominican health care ethicists Benedict Ashley 
and Kevin O’Rourke likewise give an example of forgoing life-
sustaining treatments on grounds of cost: “A father who 
contracts cancer may determine that, rather than spend his life 
savings on surgery and hospitalization, he will devote his 
savings to the education of his children, allowing the cancer to 
take its natural course.”7  In a 2005 journal article, O’Rourke 
likewise gives the example that “drug therapy for patients with 
AIDS may offer hope of benefit” but that “some patients might 
deem it an excessive burden because of the expense involved.”8 
The cost factor is found not only in the writings of 
theologians but also in magisterial documents.  The 1980 Vatican 
Declaration on Euthanasia attempted to clarify the ordinary/ 
extraordinary treatment distinction in terms of the concepts of 
“proportionate” and “disproportionate” means.9  In discussing 
decisions to forgo medical treatments, the document states that 
“it will be possible to make a correct judgment as to the means 
by studying the type of treatment to be used, its degree of 
complexity or risk, its cost and the possibilities of using it, and 
comparing these elements with the result that can be 
expected.”10 
 
 6.  Id. (citing EDWIN F. HEALY, MEDICAL ETHICS 68 (Loyola Univ. Press 1956)).  
 7.  BENEDICT M. ASHLEY & KEVIN D. O’ROURKE, HEALTH CARE ETHICS: A 
THEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 424 (4th ed. 1997). 
 8.  Kevin D. O’Rourke, The Catholic Tradition on Forgoing Life Support, 5 NAT’L 
CATHOLIC BIOETHICS Q. 537, 547 (2005).  Recent discussions of using/forgoing 
medical treatments take it for granted that the cost factor is to be considered.  See 
Daniel J. Daly, Prudence and the Debate on Death and Dying, HEALTH PROGRESS, 
Sept.‒Oct. 2007, at 49, 52 (“In the case of a physician trying to discern the proper 
treatment of a patient in natural decline, he or she must know, among other things, 
the patient’s physical, spiritual, and psychological condition; the patient’s (and/or the 
patient’s family’s) economic situation; the patient’s relationships; the effects of the 
patient’s treatment on the society at large; and the prognoses for various 
treatments.” (emphasis added)). 
 9.  Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Euthanasia, 
VATICAN (May 5, 1980),  http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/ 
documents/rc_con_faith _doc_19800505_euthanasia _en.html.   
 10.  Id. (emphasis added). 
13.1_(4)IDZIAK.PRINT.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/29/2012  8:40 AM 
92 MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR [Vol. 13 
The document continues: 
Therefore one cannot impose on anyone the obligation 
to have recourse to a technique which is already in use 
but which carries a risk or is burdensome. Such a 
refusal is not the equivalent of suicide; on the contrary, 
it should be considered as an acceptance of the human 
condition, or a wish to avoid the application of a 
medical procedure disproportionate to the results that 
can be expected, or a desire not to impose excessive 
expense on the family or the community.11   
Noteworthy is the explicit expansion of the cost consideration 
from the impact on the patient and his or her family to the 
impact on the community. 
The position of the Declaration on Euthanasia is reiterated in 
the current edition of the Ethical and Religious Directives for 
Catholic Health Care Services (ERD) from the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops: 
A person has a moral obligation to use ordinary or 
proportionate means of preserving his or her life.  
Proportionate means are those that in the judgment of 
the patient offer a reasonable hope of benefit and do 
not entail an excessive burden or impose excessive 
expense on the family or the community. 
 
[ ] A person may forgo extraordinary or 
disproportionate means of preserving life. 
Disproportionate means are those that in the patient’s 
judgment do not offer a reasonable hope of benefit or 
entail an excessive burden, or impose excessive expense 
on the family or the community.12 
In fact, the cost factor enters into the ERD’s explanation of 
informed consent to medical treatments: “Free and informed 
consent requires that the person or the person’s surrogate 
receive all reasonable information about the essential nature of 
the proposed treatment and its benefits; its risks, side-effects, 
 
 11.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 12.  UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND 
RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES 26–27 (5th ed. 2009) 
(Directives Nos. 56 and 57).   
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consequences, and cost.”13 
What we have described thus far can be considered “the 
tradition” within Catholic health care ethics. 
In March of 2004, Pope John Paul II delivered an allocution 
at the end of a conference on the vegetative state.14 This 
allocution is significant for charting current Church teaching on 
the provision of medically assisted nutrition and hydration.15  
However, a careful reading of the allocution also reveals a 
radical departure from the tradition regarding the relevance of 
cost to undertaking or forgoing a medical treatment: 
Considerations about the “quality of life,” often 
actually dictated by psychological, social and economic 
pressures, cannot take precedence over general 
principles.  First of all, no evaluation of costs can outweigh 
the value of the fundamental good which we are trying to 
protect, that of human life.16   
More simply stated, it is affirmed that the value of a human life 
(and its preservation) is worth more than seemingly any amount 
of money. 
Indeed, the allocution goes on to affirm a societal 
responsibility to provide financial assistance to families caring for 
patients in a vegetative state. It comments that “[the families] 
cannot be left alone with their heavy human, psychological and 
financial burden,” so “society must allot sufficient resources for 
the care of this sort of frailty, by way of bringing about 
appropriate, concrete initiatives such as . . . financial support 
and home assistance for families when patients are moved back 
home. . . .”17 
 
 13.  Id. at 17 (Directive No. 27) (emphasis added). 
 14.  John Paul II, Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State: Scientific 
Advances and Ethical Dilemmas, Address Before the International Congress (March 
20, 2004), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/ 
2004/march/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20040320_congress-fiamc_en.html. 
 15.  Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Responses to Certain Questions of 
the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Concerning Artificial Nutrition and 
Hydration, VATICAN (August 1, 2007), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ 
congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20070801_risposte-usa_en.html. 
 16.  John Paul II, supra note 14 (emphasis added). 
 17.  Id. 
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Thus we have discovered two strains of thought within 
Catholic health care ethics on the relevance of cost to decisions 
about medical treatments.  “The tradition” allows forgoing 
medical treatments on grounds of excessive expense for the 
patient, his or her family, or even the community.  A more 
recent strain of thought virtually rejects the cost factor as 
justifying forgoing a medical treatment, radically breaking with 
the tradition.  We will propose and analyze a case study as the 
springboard for critical analysis of these various positions. 
CASE STUDY 
Joe, 85, is a resident of the St. Francis Care Center.  He was admitted 
eight months ago after his second heart attack.  His wife, Janet, is also 
85, and being a full-time caregiver for Joe was a strain on her. 
Dr. Mangrum, Joe’s cardiologist, has been honest with him that 
his heart is “just giving out.” However, Dr. Mangrum has told Joe 
that a new medication is available that would likely give him “another 
six months.” 
Joe is still mentally alert.  Although Joe is restricted in his 
physical activity and is easily fatigued, he is able to enjoy playing 
cards, watching television, and visiting with members of his church 
who come to see him. 
Janet has expressed that she would like to have her husband with 
her as long as possible, especially since they will celebrate their sixtieth 
wedding anniversary in five months.  They are also awaiting the birth 
of another great-grandchild. 
The cost of the new medication for Joe for six months would be 
$60,000.18 
 
A number of questions can be posed about this case 
scenario.  From an ethical point of view, would it be permissible 
for Joe to decide to forgo using this new medication on grounds 
 
 18.  See Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration Health Care, N. Y. TIMES MAG. July 19, 
2009, at 38, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/magazine/19healthcare-
t.html (case study modeled after Peter Singer’s discussion of the drug Sutent). 
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of cost?  Ought Joe forgo this medication on grounds of cost?  
On the other hand, should Joe even be placed in a position of 
having to make a decision about using or forgoing beneficial 
medication on grounds of cost? Or, from another point of view, 
can we (and should we) as a society restrict health insurance 
payments for expensive medications that are limited in their life-
prolonging effects? 
CASE STUDY ANALYSIS: FOCUSING ON THE PATIENT 
Let us add some details to the aforementioned case.  Let us 
further suppose that Joe is a private pay resident and that 
Medicare would require a 25% co-pay for this new cardiac 
medication.19  In six months this would be $15,000, over and 
above regular nursing home costs.  Let us further suppose that 
the Joe’s and Janet’s savings have been dwindling because of 
nursing home costs and that Joe is concerned about his wife’s 
financial welfare after his virtually inevitable death within the 
next year.  He does not want his wife to end up on Medicaid 
since this might mean lower quality of care for her should she 
ever need long-term care. 
“The tradition” of Catholic health care ethics would judge it 
morally permissible, in these circumstances, for Joe to make a 
decision to forgo the new cardiac medication for himself on 
grounds of excessive expense for his wife (that is, his family).  
Does this seem right?  We find ourselves morally outraged 
when, for example, we hear accounts of people who are forced 
to decide not to use needed medications on a regular basis, or 
not at all, because they cannot afford it.20  Our moral gut reaction 
is that this kind of situation should not exist.  People should not 
 
 19.  Id. at 41. 
 20.  Id.  Consider, for example, a case reported by Peter Singer: “Dr. Art 
Kellermann, Associate Dean for Public Policy at Emory School of Medicine in 
Atlanta, recently wrote of a woman who came into his emergency room in critical 
condition because a blood vessel had burst in her brain.  She was uninsured and 
had chosen to buy food for her children instead of spending money on her blood-
pressure medicine.  In the emergency room, she received excellent high-tech 
medical care, but by the time she got there, it was too late to save her.” Id.  
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be deprived of medically needed and beneficial medications just 
because of their financial situation.  In the case of some long-
term care residents, a person suffering from a severe heart 
condition (like Joe) might also be suffering from other medical 
conditions (co-morbidities) such as Parkinson’s disease and/or 
dementia.  These conditions might well enter into our calculus 
about the value of using a very expensive drug to achieve a 
limited prolongation of life.  But Joe represents our proverbial 
“hard case.” 
In the case of Joe, the expensive medication would clearly 
be beneficial for him in ways beyond a brute prolongation of 
biological life for six months.  Prolonging Joe’s life through the 
use of the new medication would be beneficial to him on a 
personal level: it would likely give him and his wife the joy of 
celebrating their sixtieth wedding anniversary as well as seeing 
the birth of another great-grandchild. Those extra six months 
might also give Joe the opportunity for increased spiritual 
preparation for death, perhaps including the reconciliation of 
strained relationships.  In the spirit of John Paul II’s allocution 
we might ask, Isn’t Joe’s life worth more than the cost of the 
medication? 
This intuition is reinforced by the strong emphasis placed 
by Catholic social teaching on the sanctity of human life and the 
dignity of the human person: 
Human personhood must be respected with a 
reverence that is religious.  When we deal with each 
other, we should do so with the sense of awe that arises 
in the presence of something holy and sacred.  For that 
is what human beings are: we are created in the image 
of God.21 
Persons in long term care—like Joe in our hypothetical case 
study—share no less in the inherent dignity and sacredness of 
human life.  The fact that his death is foreseeable from his 
cardiac medical problems does not make his life any less 
 
 21.  Statement by U.S. Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral 
Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy (1986), available at 
http://www.osjspm.org/admin/document.doc?id=93 (citing Genesis 1:27). 
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valuable. 
At this point, someone might assert that Joe, just like every 
other person, has a right to health care.  Indeed, in their 1993 
document A Framework for Comprehensive Health Care Reform, the 
Catholic Bishops of the United States present “the sanctity of 
human life and the dignity that belongs to all human persons” 
as grounding for the claim that “all people have a right to health 
care.”22  This document goes on to “insist that every human 
being has the right to quality health services, regardless of age, 
income, illness, or condition of life.”23  Since responsibilities 
correlate with rights,24 it would seem that John Paul II’s  
allocution is correct in affirming a societal obligation to assist 
patients and families financially with health care costs. 
CASE STUDY ANALYSIS: FOCUSING ON THE COMMUNITY 
In our hypothetical case study, we have thus far focused on 
the impact of the cost of the medication for the patient and his 
immediate family.  However, there is a communal dimension of 
the case to consider, namely, the impact on the health insurance 
program of which the patient is a part, ex hypothesi, some of the 
cost of Joe’s medication will be covered by health insurance.  
Will paying for very expensive medications for patients like Joe 
mean that premiums will increase for other people?25 Will it 
mean that health care services for other categories of patients 
may be cut from coverage?26 
 
 22.  CATHOLIC BISHOPS OF THE U.S., A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPREHENSIVE 
HEALTH CARE REFORM: PROTECTING HUMAN LIFE, PROMOTING HUMAN DIGNITY, 
PURSUING THE COMMON GOOD 1 (June 18, 1993). 
 23.  Id. at 3. 
 24.  An Introduction to the Principles of Catholic Social Thought, UNIVERSITY OF 
NOTRE DAME, http://social concerns.nd.edu/mission/cst/cst3.shtml (last visited Dec. 
13, 2011). 
 25.  Singer, supra note 18, at 39. 
 26.  O’Rourke, supra note 8, at 553 (internal citations omitted): 
  
Community Interest 
  The community is also mentioned as a stakeholder when decisions 
about life support are necessary.  People belong to small and large 
communities.  In a small community, the expense and care that a 
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While the Catholic tradition places value on the life of the 
individual, this tradition also sees humans as essentially social 
beings who achieve fulfillment in relationship with others. Catholic 
social teaching rejects the pure individualism that has 
characterized American society and affirms the value of the 
community.  Concomitantly, the Catholic tradition holds a 
concept of the common good.27  Recognition of the social 
dimension of human life and of a common good provides 
grounding for the traditional view of Catholic health care ethics 
that imposing excessive expense on the community justifies 
forgoing a medical treatment.28 
Strictly speaking, the language of the Ethical and Religious 
Directives for Catholic Health Care Services gives an individual 
permission to make a decision to forgo a medical treatment on 
grounds of imposing excessive expense on the community.29  
 
particular therapy might impose could be a factor when decisions about 
life support are made, because if funds are not expended for one person, 
they may benefit another person.  In religious communities, for example, 
there is usually a fund to finance health care.  But this fund is not an 
insurance fund in the strict sense; the members of the community 
contribute to it.  Thus, if a community member requires extensive therapy, 
others in the community may not have access to adequate therapy, or the 
contributions of individual members may have to be increased. 
  Recently, a friend of mine who is prominent in the field of bioethics 
was afflicted with a serious stroke, and refused extensive therapy, stating 
that he did not want to expend the funds of his community upon therapy 
that would have doubtful success.  In other words, he determined that in 
his condition, and given the finances of the community, such care would 
not offer hope of benefit and was therefore extraordinary, even though it 
would have prolonged his life. 
  At present, given the method of paying for health care in the United 
States, the larger community, the state, or the insurance company do not 
often become a significant factor in making decisions about forgoing life 
support.  While the funding methods of state-sponsored health care and 
insurance companies are too complicated to discuss in this article, if care is 
withheld or removed from one person, there does not seem to be a direct 
benefit for another person, and the uninsured do not benefit from cost 
reduction for the insured.  This situation could change if universal health 
care ever becomes a reality within the social policy in the United States. 
 
 27.  PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL 
DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH 71–75 (2005). 
 28.  ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE 
SERVICES, supra note 12, at 26–27. 
 29.  Id. 
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Should we go a step further and say that an individual has or 
ought to have a moral obligation to forgo a medical treatment 
which is of this character out of regard for the common good?  
Concomitantly, on grounds of “excessive expense for the 
community,” could societal decisions be justified that would limit 
access to health care services on grounds of cost?  In other 
words, do we find in traditional Catholic health care ethics a 
strain of thought which could support societal decisions to ration 
health care services on grounds of cost? 
Our hypothetical case of long-term care resident Joe is 
related to an actual case discussed by ethicist Peter Singer in a 
New York Times editorial entitled “Why We Must Ration Health 
Care.”30 Singer relates that in 2008 Britain’s National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) initially recommended 
that the National Health Service should not offer the drug Sutent 
for advanced kidney cancer.31  Specifically, “NICE had set a 
general limit of £30,000, or about $49,000, on the cost of 
extending life for a year.  Sutent, when used for advanced 
kidney cancer, cost more than that, [while offering] only about 
six months extra life.”32  According to this criterion, long-term 
care resident Joe would not be entitled to receive the new 
cardiac medication because it cost $60,000 for a predicted life 
extension of only six months. 
John Paul II’s allocution asserted that “no evaluation of 
costs can outweigh the value of the fundamental good which we 
are trying to protect, that of human life.”33  Upon reflection it 
does not seem that we can implement such an unqualified claim 
in a health care context. As ethicist Philip Keane points out, 
“health care is only one of a number of basic human goods[, and 
w]e also have to think about the responsibility of society to 
provide for other goods, such as education, housing, 
transportation, communication, and aesthetic human 
 
 30.  See Singer, supra note 18, at 39–40. 
 31.  Id. at 40. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  John Paul II, supra note 14. 
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experience.”34  In other words, the financial resources that can be 
devoted to health care will always be finite and limited in scope.  
As Keane speculates, “[i]t is not possible for even a truly just 
society to provide for every conceivable health-care good.”35 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
Thus far, our reflections have pulled us in two different 
directions.  Traditional Catholic health care ethics tells us that a 
patient may choose to forego medical treatment on the grounds 
of imposing excessive expense on himself/herself or his/her 
family. This standard strikes us as unacceptable as it stands.  
Someone having to forgo medically indicated and clearly 
beneficial treatment simply on grounds of cost does not seem to 
respect the sacredness and inherent value of each and every 
human life.  Indeed, “[w]hat may be an ordinary expenditure for 
a very rich man would not be an ordinary expenditure for most 
of us.”36  Further, we now recognize a right to health care, a 
concept which was not part of the framework of discussion 
when this principle of Catholic health care ethics was 
formulated.  On one hand, society has a responsibility to ensure 
access to health care for individuals.  On the other hand, the 
Catholic tradition is not purely individualistic but recognizes a 
social dimension to human life, the value of community, and the 
common good.  These support the principle of Catholic health 
care ethics governing forgoing treatment on the basis of 
excessive expense for the community.37  This is a factor which 
could limit an individual’s access to health care services. Thus, 
we are in a position of having to balance what is owed to an 
individual with the needs of the larger community.  We propose 
four guiding  principles for working through this dilemma. 
 
 34.  KEANE, supra note 5, at 8. 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Scott M. Sullivan, The Development and Nature of the Ordinary/Extraordinary 
Means Distinction in the Roman Catholic Tradition, 21 BIOETHICS 386, 390 (2007). 
 37.  ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE 
SERVICES, supra note 12, at 27. 
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1.  Every person has a right to a basic and reasonable level of 
health care services which should be guaranteed by the 
structures of his or her society, e.g., through health insurance 
programs. 
In examining more carefully the concept of a right to health 
care, we find that the claim of a right to health care is often 
interpreted in such terms as a right of access to a “decent 
minimum” of health care38 or to a “reasonable standard” of 
health care.39  Even the aforementioned document from the U.S. 
Catholic Bishops speaks in terms of a right to “adequate” health 
care and a “decent level” of health care.40  As Catholic health 
care ethicist Philip Keane reiterates, “[w]hat a just society ought 
to do in behalf of distributive justice is to pick out a basic and 
solidly reasonable floor of health-care services and make sure 
that all citizens have access to at least these services.”41  This 
principle entails that society has an obligation to commit 
sufficient financial resources to ensuring that everyone enjoys a 
basic and reasonable level of health care services. 
2.  As much as possible, society should attempt to finance 
medically indicated and clearly beneficial health care services 
beyond the basic level. 
This is in deference to the sanctity and inherent value of 
each and every human life. 
3.  If providing a particular medical treatment to a given patient 
or class of patients beyond the basic guaranteed level would 
seriously compromise society’s ability to finance the basic 
and reasonable level of health care services for all citizens, 
then the medical treatment in question may be considered an 
 
 38.  Allen E. Buchanan, Is There a Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care?, in 
INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION: BASIC ISSUES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 525, 525–26 
(Ronald Munson ed., 8th ed. 2008). 
 39. KEANE, supra note 5, at 5. 
 40. CATHOLIC BISHOPS OF THE U.S., supra note 22, at 2–3. 
 41.  KEANE, supra note 5, at 8. 
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“excessive expense for the community” and need not be 
provided. 
Ethically, this principle is grounded in a commitment to the 
common good.42  It also provides a criterion for determining 
what qualifies as “excessive expense for the community,” a 
concept which has not been defined thus far. 
4.  In order to maximize the number of health care services 
which can be funded overall, providers of health care services 
should pursue cost-reducing efficiencies which do not 
compromise quality of care, and should act in accord with a 
standard of “fair compensation” in pricing their services. 
At this point the notoriously high cost of drugs comes into 
consideration.  Such costs could conceivably limit prescription 
drug benefits to only those drugs included in the basic package.  
If drugs are developed and produced in a way that is not cost 
efficient, or if drugs are priced beyond what constitutes fair 
compensation for development and production of them, then a 
situation may be artificially created in which some prescription 
drug benefits could be excluded as constituting “excessive 
expense for the community.” 
In his book Catholicism and Health-Care Justice, Philip Keane 
devotes a section of the sixth chapter to “The Cost of 
Prescription Medications,” noting “[t]wo special factors . . . 
relative to the cost of drugs.”43 
 
 42.  Id. at 17 (“In general, the most complete notion of proportionality in health 
care ought to include the theme of the common good, and some decisions for 
health-care rationing may be made so as to act in favor of the common good.”); 
Sullivan, supra note 36, at 395 (“For example, today’s expensive and increasing 
health care costs and the number of the uninsured, the financial status of people to 
pay for long term life support is increasingly a  moral concern as it adds to the 
burden of family and society.  One may object to this financial status criterion, 
which will likely invoke feelings of ‘choosing money over human lives’ or valuing 
money over life.  This need not be the case.  It is not the financial concerns per se that 
is at issue, but the benefit of one life versus the benefit of other lives.  One human life 
is not so valuable that it warrants extreme expenditures to the disproportionate detriment of 
others.” (emphasis in original)). 
 43.  Id. at 174–75. 
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The first factor is that “a significant part in the cost is related 
to drug manufacturers spending large amounts of time and 
money developing similar and even redundant drugs so that 
they can compete with one another in the marketplace.”44  Hence 
“[m]illions of extra dollars can be spent to develop competitive 
drugs that do very little that is new, and these costs are passed 
on to the patients.”45  Keane suggests setting some limits on 
competitive research.46 For example, “[s]tate regulatory agencies 
might limit the providers in their states to the use of no more 
than two or three similar products for a given condition, thus 
limiting the incentive for the drug manufacturers to develop too 
many drugs for the same purpose.”47 
The second factor noted by Keane deals with the enormous 
cost to develop drugs: 
Even with regulatory schemes that restrict the number 
of drugs developed, vast sums of money will be spent 
on research for and development of new drugs.  Most 
drug companies in the United States employ a two-
tiered approach to the pricing of their drugs.  In the 
United States, the drugs are priced to recover the cost 
of the research that was done to develop them.  Some of 
this cost is recovered through government grants, and 
some through direct charges to the consumer; in either 
case the consumer ultimately pays for the drugs.  When 
the companies sell the same drugs to other countries, a 
different pricing structure is often used, which pays for 
the cost of producing the drugs but not the cost of the 
research to develop the drugs in the first place.  The 
result is that U.S. manufacturers frequently sell their 
products in other countries for far lower prices than 
they charge in the United States.  One regularly reads 
accounts of U.S. citizens who live near the U.S. borders 
journeying to Mexico or Canada to buy prescription 
drugs.48 
Keane’s response to this situation is twofold.  On the one 
 
 44.  Id. at 175. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 175–76. 
 48.  Id. at 176. 
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hand, Keane thinks that “lowering the price of drugs is a socially 
responsible action on the part of the drug companies” in 
countries having “very limited economic development and 
sometimes terrible health problems.”49  On the other hand, he 
contrasts this situation with “countries with highly productive 
economies.”50 
Admittedly, “[s]ome of these countries are involved in 
research to develop new medications, and they bear some of the 
costs associated with this research.”51  But, according to Keane, it 
is the case that “the United States, and in particular drug 
consumers in the United States, are asked to bear a 
disproportionately high share of the research and development 
costs related to new medications.”52  Thus Keane proposes that 
“[i]t would seem more just to develop a formula that would 
cause all of the world’s productive economies to share equitably 
in the cost of developing new drugs.”53 
Keane suggests that “U.S. drug manufacturers might 
develop two pricing structures for products they sell outside the 
United States, one for poorer countries and one for richer 
countries.”54 According to Keane, “[s]uch an integrated 
approach would also have the effect of lowering drug prices for 
consumers in the United States, at least to some degree.”55 
The point to be drawn from Keane’s discussion is this: 
addressing factors contributing to the high cost of drugs is a 
prolegomenon to factually and ethically sound determinations 
of what drugs our society can and cannot fund. 
How do the guiding principles we have proposed apply to 
the case of long-term care resident Joe?  Joe’s cardiologist 
advises him of the availability of a new drug that would likely 
prolong his life another six months but would cost $60,000.  
 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 177. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id.   
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During those six months Joe would have a reasonable quality of 
life physically while being able to take part in activities valuable 
on a personal level (e.g., celebrating his sixtieth wedding 
anniversary, seeing the birth of another great-grand child, 
preparing spiritually for death). 
Further, let us consider the hard case in which Joe’s 
medication would not make it into the basic package of health 
care services guaranteed to him because of its limited life-
prolonging effects. 
In deference to the sanctity and inherent value of every 
human life, we should try to find a way to finance the 
medication that is medically indicated and clearly beneficial for 
Joe.  This may well involve the larger project of an honest 
examination of the current high cost of drugs, and whether 
means can be found to reduce these costs without compromising 
quality of care. This is necessary so that the availability of 
pharmaceutical resources can be maximized. 
Only after such attempts have been made could we make an 
ethically sound judgment to deny the drug to Joe.  In other 
words, only after such attempts have been made could we feel 
comfortable ethically with depriving patients of medically 
indicated and clearly beneficial drugs beyond those in the basic 
health care package on grounds of excessive expense to the 
community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
